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Privacy in Public and Private E-Mail
and On-Line Systems*
Myrna L. Wigod**
Introduction
The convenience and ease of sending information via elec-
tronic mail (e-mail) has expanded its use at an exponential rate.
However, the same technological strides that have made e-mail
possible also represent a significant threat to privacy. Elec-
tronic eavesdropping, recording, and dissemination of private
information can be accomplished with relative ease and thus
legal and technical means of protection are coming to the fore-
front of attention. This discussion addresses the interests in,
threats to, and the existing and projected protections of the pri-
vacy of e-mail communications and other information as pro-
vided by both the public Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and
private employers.
I. What Is Privacy?
To evaluate protections of e-mail privacy, it is helpful to an-
alyze the conflicting interests involved. Identification of these
interests facilitates an understanding of the policy goals of vari-
ous protections as well an assessment of how well those goals
are being met. At its most basic level, a balance must be struck
between the needs of individual privacy and autonomy, and the
legitimate needs for access to potentially private information.
An understanding of what privacy is may be aided by analyzing
* This outline was adopted from a lecture given at the 1998 Pace Law Review
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the interests and arguments on the sides of both privacy and
non-privacy.
A. Interests In Privacy
1. Privacy Of Information
Individuals have a strong need to protect their personal in-
formation. This need manifests itself in three primary areas:
Interest To Prevent Access To Personal Information - Such infor-
mation includes e-mail communications as well as personal
financial and medical records, which are becoming increas-
ingly accessible on-line.
Interest To Prevent Disclosure Of Information - In some circum-
stances, access to information may have been permitted,
but it is still important to maintain control of how that in-
formation may be disseminated.
Interest To Ensure Accuracy Of Information - If authorization to
disclose information has been given, guarantees are needed
to ensure the information is correct. This is especially criti-
cal regarding credit and health status.
2. Privacy Of Autonomy
Compromises in the security of on-line activities also raise
traditional privacy concerns:
Freedom From Observation Of Personal Communications/Acts -
This is analogous to traditional "Peeping Tom" issues. Re-
garding e-mail, this goes beyond exposure of the informa-
tion communicated and includes data such as time,
frequency, and duration of communications as well identifi-
cation of the parties involved.
Anonymity - There may be a strong interest in remaining anon-
ymous when making public statements or conducting finan-
cial transactions. The traditional analog here is the
handing out of unsigned leaflets on political or other sensi-
tive issues.
Freedom From Intrusion/Interference - In the on-line context,
one has an interest in preventing hackers from vandalizing
equipment via viruses or otherwise disrupting communica-
tions. Another problem in this area is the expanding occur-
rence of "junk e-mail."
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B. Interests In Non-Privacy
Notwithstanding the strong interest in protecting the pri-
vacy rights of individuals, there are legitimate reasons why
such protections should not be absolute.
1. Law Enforcement
To Investigate And Prevent Hackers From Gaining Access To In-
formation - If law enforcement is to protect the privacy
rights of individuals, it is necessary for such individuals to
sacrifice some of their privacy. In order to investigate the
potentially abusive activities of suspected hackers, law en-
forcement needs the legal and technical means to access
private information such as e-mail messages. Thus, subject
to certain limiting procedures, law enforcement may need
to collect information pertaining to the hackers themselves
and to the intended victims. Paradoxically, law enforce-
ment needs access to private information in order to protect
it.
To Investigate And Prevent Hackers From Disrupting Service -
As e-mail and Internet access become more ingrained in
serving social, educational and economic functions, law en-
forcement will have greater responsibility to ensure service
is maintained.
To Prevent And Investigate The Use Of E-mail To Plan/Coordi-
nate Crime - This is analogous to traditional wire-tapping
of telephone lines. Individual privacy interests must be
balanced against society's need to thwart criminal activity.
2. Employment
Observation And Documentation Of Employee Activities - Em-
ployers justify monitoring employee e-mail by claiming that
surveillance is necessary to keep track of the affairs of the
business. Employers argue that their e-mail systems are
provided primarily for business purposes and that they
should have a right to enforce this limitation. In addition,
some employers use electronic surveillance to help objec-
tively gauge productivity by logging time spent on-line or
on the telephone.
Protecting The Integrity Of Employee Time Billed To Customers
- In industries where employee time is directly billed to the
3
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employer's customer, such as government contracting or
the legal profession, the employer has an ethical duty to en-
sure that such time is billed appropriately. Therefore, em-
ployers have a need to verify that customer time is not
being mischarged via abuse of company e-mail and tele-
phone systems.
Protection Of Property And Trade Secrets - Just as law enforce-
ment has a need to guard against theft, so do employers.
Because e-mail provides an extremely easy way to dissemi-
nate sensitive company information, the ability to control
such dissemination could determine the viability of an
organization.
Protection Against Liability For Employee Acts - E-mail has
been abused to perpetrate libel, sexual harassment, hate
crimes and copyright infringement. Since employers may
be held liable for the illegal acts of their employees, they
must have the means to protect themselves.
3. Marketing
Narrowly Targeting Advertising To Interested Parties - Gaining
access to personal information promotes more efficient mar-
keting activities. This serves the dual purposes of reducing
product costs by avoiding wasteful advertising and provid-
ing interested consumers with product information that
might not otherwise be available.
Web Site Collection Of Visitors Information - Web sites that pro-
vide free information to the public'may receive funding
from advertising revenues. They may also promote mar-
keting efficiency by providing collected demographic infor-
mation to marketers.
4. On-Line Commerce
Parties may need to give up protection of certain types of
information to promote on-line commerce. This will include dis-
closure of name, address, credit card, and demographic informa-
tion. Examples of on-line transactions include electronic
contracting, on-line purchases of information and products, and
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI).
[Vol. 19:95
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol19/iss1/6
1998] PRIVACY IN E-MAIL AND ON-LINE SYSTEMS 99
II. Who Might Violate On-Line Privacy?
A. Government
Different forms of law enforcement intrusion might include
gaining access to the Internet Service Provider (ISP) or em-
ployer stored data, monitoring communications, tracing com-
munications trails and habits, and accessing encrypted data.
B. Employers
As private e-mail service providers, employers have access
to all stored employee communications data. They may also
have the ability to monitor employee live communications and
usage habits, subject to possible legal restrictions. A 1993
MacWorld survey showed that 22% of American businesses that
responded to the survey indicated that they have searched em-
ployee files, e-mail, or other communications. For companies
with more than 1000 employees, the number increased to over
30%. This monitoring is often without notice to the employees
and few companies have a formal policy on the issue.
C. Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
ISPs can increase their revenues by collecting and disclos-
ing profile data on their customers. They also have the techno-
logical ability to access, monitor, intercept, and disclose both
live and stored e-mail communications on their systems. Such
disclosure might be legally permitted either in response to law
enforcement directives or to reasonably protect against liability
caused by customer misuse of ISP property. America Online
(AOL) recently changed its privacy policy to add subscriber
phone numbers to the list of personal information that it sells to
direct marketers. Previously, AOL's privacy policy prevented
the disclosure of subscriber telephone numbers, while allowing
the company to sell member names and addresses. The new
policy took effect on July 31, 1997. While AOL will generally
not disclose "navigational" or "transactional" information (such
as where you go or what you buy through AOL) to third parties,
it may use such information to develop member lists for compa-
nies with which AOL has a contractual marketing relationship.
5
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D. Site Providers
Web site providers can closely monitor the activities of indi-
viduals that access their sites. Web sites may require a user to
"sign in" in order to access the site and the site providers may
aggregate and disclose such profile data (including e-mail ad-
dress). In addition, site providers may store and disclose any
communications made with that site, and they may trace and
store a user's movements and preferences within the pages of
the site.
E. Other Users
Other users both on public and private networks may at-
tempt to access e-mail communications and other private infor-
mation. This may be to further criminal activity or simply out
of curiosity. Such invasive activity may include accessing past
user discussions, searching for confidential stored information,
and hacking into an ISP site.
III. Manner Of Violation
A. Threats Against Privacy Of Information
1. Collecting Clickstream Data
Because a user's connection to the Internet is made via an
ISP, the ISP can monitor the user's activities and record every
website visited. The observable trail of the web travel is called
the user's "clickstream." In addition, web sites can also gain in-
formation regarding web movement. Based on analysis of the
"packets" of data that are used to carry information within the
Internet, it is possible to determine certain information from a
given user's packet data (e.g. source location, e-mail address).
In this way a web site can observe which pages a user visited
within the current site, and can also identify the previous and
next sites visited by the user. This "clickstream" data of elec-
tronic markers generated by a user's browsing activities can be
aggregated, stored, and reused. Note that this aggregation of
data is particularly telling if done by a site host of an Internet
search engine (e.g., Yahoo). The search engine site can monitor
both the type of information that a user is seeking (patterns of
research), and the web sites visited to obtain that information.
100 [Vol. 19:95
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2. Cookies / Web Site Monitoring
a. Cookies
A web site's server computer can track a user's activity
(e.g., pages visited) within that site and collect and/or save that
data in a file. Then, during the communications interchange
between the server and the user's computer, the server may re-
quest that this file or "cookie" be placed on the user's hard disk.
The "cookie" may then be reused to identify the user's prefer-
ences based on this historical data the next time she accesses
that site. The web site may then present particular advertising
targeted at the user or may route the user through particular
pages on the site. In response to this practice, some newer web
browsers detect when the "cookie" request is made and alert the
user. If the user declines acceptance of the cookie, its transmis-
sion will be blocked. Cookies, as simple text files, do not contain
executable code that could be used to transmit a computer virus
or to read information residing on a user's hard disk. However,
any information disclosed by a user while visiting a site (e.g.
name, address, credit card number) could be stored in a cookie
for later access by the web site. A cookie deposited by a particu-
lar server generally cannot be accessed or read by a different
server.'
b. Monitoring
Analysis of packet data can also reveal the "Internet Pro-
vider Address" of the user's computer as assigned by the user's
ISP. A request may then be sent to an Internet "name server"
computer to map this IP Address to the alphabetic name as-
signed to a user's computer. This information may reveal the
identity of the user's ISP and may be used to help ascertain a
user's e-mail address.
1. A cookie may be read by another server if that second server is in the same
domain as the server that originally set the cookie. For example, any server within
the netscape.com domain could read a Netscape cookie, whereas a server in
mydomain.com could not.
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3. Collection Of Data By Users Via On-Line Search
Engines
A number of on-line services or "search engines" are readily
available to help find information on the web. While these serv-
ices are essential to make productive use of the network, they
may also reveal private information. In particular, some search
engines are specialized to assist in gaining specific information
about other users. Examples are:
WebCrawler2 - This search engine has a "Voyeur" feature that
allows others to see the result of a user's searches for infor-
mation. The feature provides a sampling of the key words
being used by other users so that the search results based
on these keywords can be viewed. WebCrawler states that
"the Search Voyeur continuously displays actual searches
that people are doing on WebCrawler. [However,] Web-
Crawler receives over 5 million queries a day, making it im-
possible for anyone, WebCrawler staff included, to make
the association between a particular search and the person
who initiated it." 3 Given the ingenuity of the hacker com-
munity, this may not be an adequate assurance.
DejaNews4 - This search engine catalogs and indexes more than
15,000 Usenet groups. The members of these groups are
required to provide profile data prior to gaining member-
ship to the groups, and thus these profiles are available to
searching parties, as are all Usenet postings made by any
given user. As an example of use of this service, the New
York Times reported that a search made on privacy and
cryptography advocate Tim May yielded his phone number,
e-mail address, and 527 messages he had posted over the
previous 18 months on various topics. 5
Four 116 - This search engine is dedicated to searching its
database of e-mail addresses, but many e-mail addresses
2. WebCrawler (visited Oct. 24, 1998) <http://voyeur.mckinley.com> or <http:/!
webcrawler.com>.
3. Webcrawler Search Voyeur (visited Oct. 24, 1998) <http://webcrawler.com/
SearchTicker.html>.
4. Deja News (visited Oct. 24, 1998) <http://www.dejanews.com>.
5. See Matthew Hawn, As the Web Expands, So Do Serveillance Tools, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 6, 1997, at D5.
6. Yahoo! People Search (visited Oct. 24, 1998) <http://www.fourll.com> or
<http://people.yahoo.com>.
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are not listed in the database. Currently, the database only
contains the addresses of individuals that have signed up to
be included in its list.
The Stalker's Home Page7 - This web site is devoted to helping
people collect information on other people via on-line re-
sources. The site is comprised of links to other databases
containing advice and information as to how to conduct per-
sonal searches.
American Information Network8 - This for-payment service has
access to additional databases. It can gain private informa-
tion not available by the free services.
Altavista,9 Yahoo, 10 Excite," Lycos 12 - These popular standard
search engines provide facilities to search for individuals by
name. Information provided by such a search may include
e-mail address, street address, and phone number.
Although most web users believe that their activities are largely
anonymous, this is very likely a mistaken assumption.
4. ISP Monitoring
As the focal point of a user's Internet activity, the ISP
stands in a unique and powerful position to access information
about a person, control and monitor usage, and disclose this in-
formation to others (e.g., law enforcement, marketers). As the
user's gateway to the net, it is technically possible for an ISP to
monitor each mouse click and keystroke made during a session.
The ISP also has complete access to any stored data or message
characteristics passing through its facility, and is permitted to
exploit this access within few legal limits under the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986.13 In addition,
user profile data is usually collected upon sign-up for the service
and could later be disclosed unless expressly agreed otherwise.
7. The Stalker's Home Page - No More Privacy! - As Seen on the LEEZA
Show (visited Oct. 24, 1998) <http://www.glr.com/stalk.html>.
8. AiNET (visited Oct. 24, 1998) <http://www.ain.com>.
9. AltaVista: Main Page (visited Oct. 24, 1998) <http://
www.altavista.digital.com>.
10. Yahoo! (visited Oct. 24, 1998) <http://www.yahoo.com>.
11. Excite (visited Oct. 24, 1998) <http://www.excite.com>.
12. Lycos: Your Personal Internet Guide (visited Oct. 24, 1998) <http://
www.lycos.com>.
13. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (1994).
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5. Collection Of Data Via Voluntary Means
Consensual Disclosure - In addition to unauthorized access to
personal information, users may provide such information
by "consent." Often users must fill out forms disclosing in-
formation. However, they may not fully appreciate the ex-
tent to which that information will be used. For example,
Web sites and on-line vendors may request personal data
before a service is provided or before an item is sold or li-
censed. Once released, the consumer has no further control
and the released information may be placed on undesirable
mailing lists.
Opt-In vs. Opt-Out Approaches - In some cases, users are pro-
vided with the option of whether they wish to disclose per-
sonal information. The manner in which this option is
presented can make a difference in its effectiveness in pro-
tecting privacy. The approach favored by privacy advocates
is the "Opt-in" method, where consumer information is not
used unless the user affirmatively releases it. The mirror
image preferred by business advocates is the "Opt-out"
method, where such personal information may be freely
used unless the users notify marketers otherwise. Obvi-
ously the preferred approach depends on which side of the
fence one stands. In order for the option to be effective
however, notice of the option must be given to users. The
opt-in approach ensures that the consumer is aware of the
right to choose. Under the opt-out approach, consumers
may assume that the option is simply not available, or more
likely will not even think about it.
Sensitive Data (e.g., Medical and Financial) - Special concerns
are raised when collected information moves beyond simple
identity or address data to more sensitive areas. Disclosure
of medical and financial records can have a profound effect
on a person's job security, ability to get insurance, ability to
get credit, and numerous other critical affairs. Because
medical and financial institutions in possession of private
data are now on-line, there are broad concerns about the
ethical responsibilities of these entities. On-line access ex-
poses a great potential for unauthorized access and com-
mercial disclosure of such data and thus strong legal
controls are desirable. As noted however, such controls
104 [Vol. 19:95
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must recognize that the need for privacy is balanced
against the interests of vendors and financial institutions
that have a legitimate need to evaluate creditworthiness.
On-Line Discussions - Information voluntarily provided during
chat sessions and user group discussions is now available to
the world via the search methods described above. Where
the Internet was previously comprised of a rather small
group of technically oriented individuals, such discussions
are now exposed to a much broader audience.
6. Federal Reserve Board
In March 1997, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) con-
ducted a study to determine the public availability of "sensitive
identifying information" about consumers, such as social secur-
ity number, mother's maiden name, and date of birth. The FRB
is presently seeking public comment. This initiative was trig-
gered by the well-publicized Lexis-Nexis P-TRAK service that
made this type of information readily available but that has
been discontinued due to public outcry. The report's conclu-
sions stated that, "fraud related to identity theft appears to be a
growing risk for consumers and financial institutions, and the
relatively easy access to personal information may expand the
risk." While the FRB was asked to provide recommendations
to Congress regarding legislation, the report merely stated that
"[in considering whether any legislation is desirable, the Con-
gress must carefully evaluate whether the availability of sensi-
tive information poses a sufficient risk to consumers and
institutions to justify new laws."
7. Federal Trade Commission
In 1996, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) published a
report entitled "Public Workshop of Consumer Privacy on the
Global Information Infrastructure."1 4 This report examined
consumer privacy issues in the on-line context to promote edu-
cation about the use of personal information on-line. 15 More re-
cently, in response to a request by Congress to investigate
"possible violations of consumer privacy rights by companies
14. 61 Fed. Reg. 24,499 (1996).
15. See id.
11
PACE LAW REVIEW
that operate computer data bases," the FTC published a Decem-
ber 1997 report titled "Individual Reference Services."'1 6 This re-
port investigated the individual reference service industry, and
for the most part endorsed industry guidelines that restrict ac-
cess to non-public information such as social security num-
bers. 17 The report criticized the individual reference service
industry, noting that consumers do not have access to the infor-
mation collected concerning them, and have no means to correct
inaccuracies.' 8 Privacy advocates criticized the report for its ac-
ceptance of industry guidelines.
8. Social Security Administration
In March 1997, the Social Security Administration (SSA)
offered its Interactive Personal Earnings and Benefits Estimate
Statement (PEBES) service to provide citizens with access to
their Social Security payment information. However, the ser-
vice was suspended on April 9, 1997 following public concerns
about the risk of improper access to personal information held
by the agency.19 The SSA now offers a modified version of the
service that uses Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) technology to al-
low on-line requests of the PEBES, however the statement will
be sent back only by paper mail. The SSA is still researching
the full Interactive PEBES capability and conducted a series of
national forums to hear from experts in the areas of privacy and
computer security, as well as members of the public. The public
forums ended on June 16 and the full report was released on
September 4, 1997.20 Privacy experts expressed support for the
SSA recommendations, stating that the agency has done a good
job meeting with the public, consulting with experts and devel-
oping sensible standards to protect personal information. The
SSA experience with Internet service delivery is being watched
closely by other federal agencies as well as private companies
16. Robert Pitofsky et al., Individual Reference Services (visited Oct. 24, 1998)
<http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/privacy/wkshp97/
irsdocl.htm#IndividualReferenceServices>.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See Notice of Social Security Forums: Privacy and Customer Service in the
Electronic Age, 62 Fed. Reg. 23,525, 23,526 (1997).
20. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, PuB. No. 03-012, PRIVACY AND CUS-
TOMER SERVICE IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE: REPORT TO OUR CUSTOMERS (1997).
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which hope to take advantage of the Internet and avoid public
concerns about privacy.
9. Compromise Of Medical Records
While leveraging modern advances in information technol-
ogy, the health care industry's placement of patient medical
records in computer databases has created a potential for abuse
of individual privacy. The ease of electronic networking and
sharing of information has caused concern that sensitive data
will be accessed and misused. Negative results of the prolifera-
tion of private data may include loss of job, denial of insurance
and commercial exploitation or "data mining." Presently, there
is no federal statute for blanket protection of the confidentiality
of medical records, but there is an initiative in the works to pass
such a law. In 1996, Congress passed the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) to regulate the
health insurance industry "to combat waste, fraud, and
abuse."21 The law contains particular provisions to assure that
medical information is utilized in a manner that appropriately
protects the confidentiality of the information and the privacy of
individuals receiving health care services and items. 22 HIPAA
established standards for confidential transmission of electronic
records, levied criminal sanctions for wrongful disclosure of in-
dividual's identifiable health information, and required the Sec-
retary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to recommend to
Congress standards for protection of privacy of individually
identifiable records. 23 The purpose of these recommendations
was to 1) permit patients to copy records and propose correc-
tions, 2) require health care organizations to explain how
records will be disclosed, 3) allow patients to control access to
information, 4) permit patients to control the use and disclosure
of information, and 5) make unauthorized disclosure a crime.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned recommendations,
Congress determined a number of situations in which health
21. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 42 U.S.C.).
22. See id. §§ 264, 1177, 2713, 110 Stat. at 1966, 2033, 2029.
23. See id. §§ 264(a), 306(k)(5)(A)(viii)(B)-(C), 1177, 110 Stat. at 2029, 2032,
2033.
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care information will be disclosed without the patient's consent.
These disclosures may be:
for health care and payment (however the patient may restrict
disclosures of certain information or to certain persons);
for health oversight to licensed providers, government agencies,
and medical organizations;
to protect the public health;
for research, subject to government authorization;
in emergency situations;
to next of kin;
to law enforcement; or
in judicial proceedings.24
B. Threats To Communications
1. Access To Private Communications
One's on-line communications do not enjoy the level of pri-
vacy that is generally afforded other communications means,
such as public telephone and traditional mail. As noted, private
e-mail messages may be monitored, stored and disclosed by
ISPs and employers, subject to certain limitations. In addition,
e-mail messages to web sites, vendors or any other party may be
stored and later disclosed. In contrast to telephone communica-
tions that are rarely recorded for later use, e-mail messages are
always recorded unless the recipient affirmatively destroys
them. Computer technology provides a simple means to
reproduce, edit, or disclose such messages.
2. Anonymity
Again, in contrast to some traditional venues, on-line tech-
nology makes it difficult for an individual to speak anony-
mously. Controversial speech or ideas may not be able to be
disseminated without the speaker's identity being clearly
known. Thus, this infringement on privacy spills over into the
area of the First Amendment.25 It is also difficult to purchase
items on-line without leaving an audit trail identifying who the
purchaser was. This may be contrasted with familiar cash
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-61 (1996).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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transactions in which the trail of hands through which money
has passed is unknown.
3. Intrusion
Junk E-mail Or "Spamming"26 - While "cookies" and other unau-
thorized access to one's computer are obvious forms of intrusion,
junk e-mail "bombings" or "spamming" may be a primary threat
to the overall usefulness of the e-mail system. In addition to clog-
ging or slowing down the entire system, mass mailings of un-
wanted messages could distract users from important messages
and ultimately make an individual's e-mail account impractical to
use. Junk e-mail may also increase a user's per minute on-line or
telephone charges. While junk e-mail is a potential threat, recent
cases have curtailed its use:
CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.27 - In this case, mass
advertising e-mailer Cyber Promotions sent thousands of unsolic-
ited e-mail advertisements to CompuServe customers. 28 In addi-
tion, Cyber configured its computers so that the messages falsely
appeared to originate from a CompuServe address.29 This caused
large numbers of undeliverable messages to be "returned" to Com-
puServe for storage. 30 The court granted an injunction to Com-
puServe based on unfair competition and conversion claims,3 1
holding that the excessive storage required for the undeliverable
messages consumed the capacity of several of CompuServe's com-
puters, thereby representing an actionable trespass to chattels for
which the First Amendment provided no defense. 32
Cyber Promotions Inc. v. America Online Inc. 33 - In this case,
Cyber used the same tactics against AOL as it did against Com-
puServe, but AOL retaliated by blocking the incoming messages
from Cyber. 34 In two separate proceedings, a Pennsylvania court
found that (1) AOL's blocking of messages could not deny Cyber's
First Amendment rights because AOL was not a state actor, and
26. Lately, the term "spamming" has been used to refer to any unsolicited
junk e-mail or posting scheme, while previously, the term "spam" only referred to
mass postings on Usenet listings.
27. 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D.Ohio 1997).
28. See id. at 1017.
29. See id. at 1019.
30. See id. at 1022.
31. See id. at 1028.
32. See CompServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1022.
33. 948 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.Pa. 1996).
34. See id. at 460.
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(2) AOL had not violated anti-trust laws because its e-mail service
was not an "essential facility" under anti-trust law.
35
Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Apex Global Information Services, Inc. 36
- After the above disputes, ISPs refused to provide service to
Cyber as a customer. 37 One such ISP, Apex Global Information
Services, Inc., cut off Cyber's existing service without notice. 38
Cyber sued Apex under breach of contract and succeeded in ob-
taining a preliminary injunction from the court, ordering Apex to
restore service for a six-week period while Cyber made other ar-
rangements for Internet access.39 As a result, Cyber is now set-
ting itself up as a specialized ISP to send unsolicited mass
mailings for its advertising customers. However, several states
are considering legislation that would make the sending of unso-
licited ads directly to e-mail accounts a misdemeanor.
Usenet Spamming -Another type of on-line advertising spamming
abuse occurs when an advertiser posts a commercial message to a
large number of Usenet news groups or to the members of an e-
mail mailing list. In one case, when a pair of lawyers engaged in
spamming to advertise their "Green Card" services for immi-
grants, the outraged Usenet readers retaliated by publishing pro-
test messages, implementing software to erase future messages
by the lawyers, and placing fake pizza orders to the lawyers' ad-
dress. While there was never a legal action involved, the on-line
social pressure forced the lawyers to cease their activity.
IV. Legal Protections And Limits
A. Federal Constitution
Any privacy protections afforded by the federal Constitu-
tion are limited by the state action requirement. Constraints on
access to private information and communications arising from
the Constitution apply only to Government entities and not to
private parties like ISPs or employers. There are three poten-
tial sources of protection:
35. See id. at 457-58.
36. 1997 WL 634384 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 30, 1997)(No. CIV. A. 97-5931).
37. See id. at *1.
38. See id.
39. See id.
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1. First Amendment 40
First Amendment protections limit the government's abil-
ity to seize data where such intrusiveness would interfere with
the ability to publish or distribute speech. The Privacy Protec-
tion Act (PPA), as discussed below, was enacted in 1980 to pro-
tect publishers' First Amendment right to freedom of the press
against government interference. 41
Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service42 - The Secret
Service, in pursuit of a hacker group, seized computers and
other materials of a company's electronic bulletin board
system (BBS).43 The court held that the PPA protects per-
sons "reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate
to the public a newspaper, broadcast, or other similar form
of public communication.. ." and awarded damages for lost
business caused by the seizure of First Amendment
materials.44
2. Fourth Amendment45
The primary source of protection in the on-line context
stems from the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. As a threshold matter, the
Fourth Amendment can only afford protection to e-mail commu-
nications if the affected party has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in such communications.
United States v. Maxwell 46 - In this case, where e-mail was be-
ing used to transmit child pornography, the court found a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy, stating that the "appellant
definitely maintained an objective expectation of privacy in any
e-mail transmissions he made so long as they were stored in the
America Online computers."47 The ECPA, discussed in detail
below, provides further law in the on-line search and seizure
area.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (1996).
42. 816 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Texas 1993), affd, 36 F.3d 457 (5t" Cir. 1994).
43. See id. at 437.
44. Id. at 440; See 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a) (1996).
45. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
46. 42 M.J. 568 (A.F.C.C.A. 1995).
47. Id. at 576.
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United States v. Charbonneau48 - Conversely, a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy was not found in statements made on-line
in a private Internet "chat room."49 In this case, an FBI opera-
tive entered chat rooms posing as a pedophile and monitored
conversations regarding the transmission of child pornogra-
phy.50 When the defendant claimed that his statements made
in the chat room were protected by the Fourth Amendment, the
court stated that
[dlefendant could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the chat rooms. Accordingly, the e-mail sent by Defendant to
others in a "chat room" is not afforded any semblance of privacy;
the government may present the evidence at trial. In addition, all
e-mail sent or forwarded to the undercover agents is not protected
by the Fourth Amendment.5 1
Thus, the expectation of privacy found in Maxwell did not ex-
tend to e-mail messages after they had been received by the in-
tended recipient. 52
3. Second Amendment 53
While the government has placed restrictions on the export
of encryption software, it can be argued that this is a violation
of the right to bear arms. Since encryption software has been
classified as "munitions," it is arguable that this places such
software under Second Amendment protection. 54 There is no
case law on this issue to date.
B. State Constitutions
While state constitutions typically provide provisions simi-
lar to those of the federal Constitution, states are free to add
additional protections above the "floor" of the federal Constitu-
tion. These additional protections may also extend to private
actors.
48. 979 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
49. See id. at 1185.
50. See id. at 1179.
51. Id. at 1185.
52. See id.
53. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
54. See 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (1998).
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C. Federal Statutes
1. ECPA (Anti-Wiretapping Statute)55
a. Basic Provisions Of The ECPA56
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, which
amended Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, is the only federal statute that specifically
addresses interception and access of electronic communications.
The ECPA prohibits the unauthorized interception, access, dis-
closure, and use of the contents of electronic and wire communi-
cations subject to certain exceptions discussed below.57 These
provisions apply to both government and private actors, and vi-
olation may result in criminal, civil, and attorney fee liability.58
Evidence seized by the government in violation of the ECPA is
subject to the exclusionary rule.59 Because the ECPA extends
only to the contents of communications, transactional informa-
tion associated with electronic communications, such as the
existence of the communications, identities of parties, message
length, duration of communications, and e-mail title headers,
are not protected.60 The ECPA also distinguishes between live
communications and stored communications as further dis-
cussed below. 61
b. Title I - Access To Live Communications
Title I of the ECPA regulates interception of oral, wire, and
electronic communication by government, ISPs, and employers
(as well as other third parties).62 In the absence of consent, in-
terception of content is restricted except as a necessary incident
to:
rendering the communications service,
protecting the service provider's rights/property, or
55. 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
56. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1994).
57. See 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
58. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (1994).
59. See 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1995).
60. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2520, 2521, 2707 (1986).
61. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i)(h) (1994).
62. See id. §§ 2510, 2701.
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conducting a normal course of business (as discussed further
below). 63
Thus random monitoring or managing of message streams
is not restricted because it furthers the rendering of service. In-
terception is also permitted under reasonable suspicion of viola-
tion of ISP's rights or property.6 ISPs and employers have
much more latitude than the government, since the government
may only intercept communications with a warrant upon prob-
able cause. Note, however, that all interception is permitted
with consent of one of the parties to a communication. 65
c. The Ordinary Course Of Business Exception66
Intercept under the ECPA is defined as "the aural or other
acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral com-
munication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or
other device." 67 In turn, electronic, mechanical, or other device
is defined to mean any device or apparatus which can be used to
intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication other than
any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or
any component thereof, (i) furnished to the subscriber or user
by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in the
ordinary course of its business and being used by the subscriber
or user in the ordinary course of its business or furnished by
such subscriber or user for connection to the facilities of such
service and used in the ordinary course of its business; or (ii)
being used by a provider of wire or electronic communication
service in the ordinary course of its business, or by an investiga-
tive or law enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his du-
ties. 68 Because the statute focuses on telephone or telegraph
devices, it is not clear if these definitions are applicable to e-
mail. To date, this exception has only been applied to telephone
monitoring, but the results may also apply to e-mail privacy dis-
putes. The major cases interpreting this provision are not en-
tirely consistent in their interpretation of whether devices are
63. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(1) (1995).
64. See id. § 2511.
65. See id. §§ 2511(c)-(d).
66. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(1) (1995).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1986).
68. See id. § 2510.
114 [Vol. 19:95
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol19/iss1/6
1998] PRIVACY IN E-MAIL AND ON-LINE SYSTEMS 115
used in the ordinary course of business. These cases are sum-
marized as follows:
James v. Newspaper Agency Corp.69 - In this Tenth Circuit case,
an employer was held exempt from ECPA liability under the
ordinary course of business exception where employees were
provided with advance notice of monitoring, monitoring equip-
ment was openly installed, and no employee protested at the
time of installation.70 The employer successfully argued that
equipment used to monitor customer phone calls was necessary
to address concern over abusive language used by customers re-
garding their bills and to assist in the training of employees.71
Briggs v. American Air Filter Co. 72 - In this case, a supervisor
monitored a business call in which an employee divulged trade
secrets to a competitor.73 The employee's supervisor had partic-
ular suspicions about confidential information being disclosed
to a business competitor, had warned employee not to disclose
such information, and knew that a particular telephone call was
with an agent of the. competitor.7 4 The court found that it was
within the ordinary course of business for the supervisor to lis-
ten in on an extension phone for at least as long as the call in-
volved the type of information he feared was being disclosed.7 5
The court further noted that employer monitoring that is lim-
ited to specific occasions is less intrusive than a general practice
of surreptitious monitoring. 76
Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co. 77 On facts similar to those of
James,78 the Eleventh Circuit was presented with an issue that
was never reached in Briggs; whether the contents of a personal
call can ever be monitored in the ordinary course of business. 79
In response to this issue, the court held that employer monitor-
ing of personal calls of a telemarketing employee beyond the ex-
69. 591 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1979).
70. See id. at 582.
71. See id. at 581.
72. 630 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1980).
73. See id. at 416.
74. See id. at 416, 420.
75. See id. at 420.
76. See id. at 420 n.9.
77. 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983).
78. See id. at 583 (citing James v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 591 F.2d 579
(10th Cir. 1979)).
79. See Watkins, 704 F.2d at 583 (citing Briggs, 630 F.2d 414).
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tent necessary to determine that the calls are personal in
nature was not within the ordinary course of business.80
Deal v. Spears81 - In this case, a store owner suspected an em-
ployee of theft and attached a device to record all her telephone
conversations over six weeks.8 2 Notwithstanding the legitimate
purpose of the monitoring, the court followed Watkins and held
that the privacy intrusion was "well beyond the boundaries of
the ordinary course of business."8 3 The employer argued that,
as in Briggs, a telephone extension was used to monitor an em-
ployee suspected of harmful activity.8 4 However, the court
noted that the use of a recording device to continuously monitor
over an extended period of time went beyond the permissible
standards of Briggs.8 5 As noted, the statutory definitions and
court cases are specifically oriented to telephone conversation
monitoring. The extent to which the business use exception will
be extended to employee or Internet e-mail is unknown at this
time.
d. Title 1186 - Access To Stored Communications
Title II regulates access to communications that are
"stored" within ISP or employer facilities.8 7 The basic rule for
stored communications is that there are virtually no protections
or restrictions on ISPs or employers regarding access. A prob-
lem here is that this provision essentially overshadows any pro-
tections available under Title I. When considering e-mail and
other on-line communications, virtually all on-line communica-
tions may be technically classified as "stored" at one point or the
other. Even during an interactive "chat" session, the communi-
cations are generally placed in storage while the session is oc-
curring. One recent case has provided some guidance with
regard to the distinction between interception of live communi-
cations under Title I, and access to stored communications
80. See id.
81. 980 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1992).
82. See id. at 1155.
83. Id. at 1158.
84. See id. at 1157, 1158.
85. See id. at 1158 (citing Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414 (5th
Cir. 1980)).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (1996).
87. See id.
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under Title II. In United States v. Moriarty,88 the court held
that an individual that listened to stored voice mail messages
could only be prosecuted under Title II and not Title 1.89 The
fact that the defendant had "listened to the human voice" was
not sufficient to implicate the interception provisions of Title I,
and the court held that charges under both Title I and II were
multiplicitous in violation of the double jeopardy clause.90
e. Disclosure Under The ECPA
In addition to access, both Title I and II regulate the disclo-
sure of wire and electronic communications by ISPs and em-
ployers. Under the statute, such accessed communications may
be disclosed:
to an intended recipient;
to anyone with consent of the originator or recipient (which could
possibly be the ISP or employer itself);
to anyone, if such disclosure is necessary to continue providing
service or to protect the ISP (such disclosure could be to another
ISP if related to providing service);
to law enforcement pursuant to wiretap order, warrant, or sub-
poena; or
to law enforcement if a criminally suspicious communication was
inadvertently obtained (e.g., via random monitoring).91
2. Privacy Protection Act of 198092
a. Basic Provisions Of The PPA (Privacy Protection
Act Of 1980)93
The PPA was enacted for the purpose of protecting the
right of freedom of the press under the First Amendment, al-
lowing publishers to investigate and develop sensitive news sto-
ries without fear of government interference. The PPA
establishes safeguards protecting "publishers" from government
search and seizure of materials in their possession in the ab-
88. 962 F. Supp. 217 (D. Mass. 1997).
89. See id. at 220.
90. See id. at 222.
91. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1996).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (1996).
93. Id.
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sence of probable cause.94 Probable cause in this context re-
quires a stricter standard than under Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Under the PPA, a warrant will only issue if there
is probable cause to believe that information materials them-
selves are involved in the commission of a crime.95 The PPA
protects both "work product" (meaning materials prepared by
the publisher or author), and "documentary materials" (mean-
ing supporting records, photographs, interviews, and the like).96
b. Application To On-Line Systems
On-line systems and users are protected by the PPA if they
provide publishing services (e.g., electronic newsletters) or en-
gage in publishing related activities (e.g., collection of documen-
tary information via e-mail).97 Protection extends to the entire
on-line system on which publishing materials are kept.98
c. Remedies And Defenses
Violation of the PPA may be sanctioned by an award of
monetary damages, but illegal evidence so seized is not subject
to the exclusionary rule. 99 Law enforcement may defend a vio-
lation of the PPA by claiming a "good faith belief" in the propri-
ety of the seizure. 100 In Steve Jackson Games, at least with
regard to the initial actions by the Secret Service, the court ac-
cepted the defense that the agents did not know that the PPA
applied to ISPs.101 Note that in Steve Jackson Games, the plain-
tiffs successfully sued under both the PPA and ECPA.102
3. Telephone Consumer Protection Act Of 1991103
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) of 1991
was enacted to address consumer concerns regarding privacy
94. See id. §§ 2000aa(b)(1), 2000aa(a)(1).
95. See id. §§ 2000aa(b)(1), 2000aa(a)(1).
96. See id. § 2000aa(a).
97. See id. § 2000aa(b).
98. See 42 U.S.C. §2000aa-7(a) (1996).
99. See id. §2000aa-6(e).
100. See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service, 816 F. Supp. 432
(W.D. Texas 1993), affd, 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994).
101. See id. at 436.
102. See id. at 439.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 227 (1991).
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intrusions from the telemarketing industry. 0 4 Under this stat-
ute, the FCC may direct a company to maintain "do not call"
lists to prevent customers on such from being contacted.105 The
TCPA also makes it unlawful to solicit with an automated dial-
ing system where the consumer is charged for the call. 10 6 This
provision has a potential application to intrusion via junk e-
mail since consumers typically pay for connect time during re-
ceipt of such messages. This issue was raised by a CompuServe
customer in a suit filed regarding a CompuServe/VISA adver-
tisement received by e-mail; however, the dispute was settled
out of court.
4. Federal Records Act 10 7
The Federal Records Act was passed in 1950 to establish
the National Archives and Records Administration for the pur-
pose of creation, maintenance, management, and disposal of the
official records of federal agencies. 08 This act prohibits the dis-
posal of records by agencies without the approval of the Archi-
vist.10 9 It is important with respect to privacy because
government e-mail messages have been held to be official fed-
eral records subject to the act. In Armstrong v. Executive Office
of the President, Office of Administration,110 the court held that
computer back-up tapes containing e-mail messages from the
Reagan / Bush era were official records that could not be
erased."' Thus, government employees should be aware that
any personal information that they include in office e-mail
messages are archived and may be available for public scrutiny.
5. Communications Assistance For Law Enforcement Act
(CALEA) (Digital Telephony Law)112
Traditionally, law enforcement has been able to "tap" ana-
log telephone lines under a proper wiretap order for the purpose
104. See id.
105. See id. § 227(c)(1)(A).
106. See id. § 227(b)(1)(A).
107. 64 Stat. 583 (1950).
108. See id.
109. See 44 U.S.C. § 2108(a) (1984).
110. 1 F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
111. See id. at 1281.
112. 47 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
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of investigating crime. However, the nation's telephone lines
are rapidly shifting from analog to digital technology and, with
this shift, comes an increased technical difficulty in the ability
to eavesdrop on conversations. In the analog world, simple ac-
cess to the wires through which a telephone conversation flows
provides the opportunity to "listen in" on the conversation.
However, when voice communications are digitized, they are
sent as discrete packets of data that are multiplexed in with
other data and possibly routed through different paths before
being reassembled at the destination site. Thus, from a techni-
cal perspective, it becomes much more difficult to perform sur-
veillance of communications made via digital telephony. In
response to this development, the FBI successfully lobbied Con-
gress to pass a new law to facilitate "wire tapping" of digital
communications in order to restore the status quo. The 1994
CALEA (Digital Telephony Law) requires the telephone indus-
try to conform its networks to allow for wiretapping via ad-
vanced switching equipment. 113 At the same time, the law
requires that government pay for any advanced features that
are not readily available.114 The FBI is presently developing
rules and proposals on how to implement the law.
As related to e-mail, the law has significant provisions
whereby it:
requires a court order for law enforcement to obtain e-mail ad-
dresses and other similar transactional data from ISPs;115
specifically excuses ISPs from modifying their equipment to facili-
tate authorized government interception (however, ISPs are still
subject to ECPA disclosure requirements regarding messages);116
does not limit rights to use encryption. 117
This last point is important because, even if law enforce-
ment has the capability to tap digital phone lines, it would be
frustrated if messages passing through these lines are protected
by strong encryption. This means that law enforcement will
continue to support measures such as Clipper that provide gov-
ernment with the technical means to de-encrypt private
113. See id. § 1002(a).
114. See id. § 1007(c).
115. See id. § 1002(a).
116. See id. § 1002(b)(2).
117. See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(3).
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messages. Since the enactment of CALEA, there have been con-
tinued delays in its implementation due to disputes between the
FBI and industry. The discussions broke down after industry
negotiators concluded that the FBI was seeking to significantly
broaden its surveillance powers and require many more techni-
cal changes than CALEA envisions. However, following a meet-
ing with Attorney General Janet Reno and FBI Director Louis
Freeh on March 6, industry executives agreed to resume negoti-
ations over implementation of the act. The impasse has delayed
implementation of CALEA, which required new wiretap-
friendly technology to be in place by October 28, 1998.118
6. Privacy Act Of 1974119
a. Background
The Privacy Act of 1974 was an amendment to the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA),120 aimed at increasing the privacy
protections of the FOIA. While the FOIA's primary goal is to
make government information available to the public, it also
contains exceptions that restrict disclosure of certain informa-
tion in an effort to protect privacy. 121 The Privacy Act was cre-
ated to further prevent government from disclosing computer
database records maintained on an individual for any other
purpose than that originally intended without consent. The act
was amended by the Computer Matching and Privacy Act of
1988,122 which limits government use of database "matching"
techniques to aggregate information on individuals and then
terminate benefits without notice and a hearing.123
b. Basic Provisions
As previously stated, the Privacy Act regulates government
disclosure of information within its databases. The existence of
databases of personal information must be made known to the
public.124 The Privacy Act does allow information in these
118. See id. § 1001 (notes).
119. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1974).
120. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1996).
121. See id. § 552(b)(6).
122. Pub.L.No. 100-503 (1994).
123. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a) (notes) (West 1994).
124. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (amended 1996).
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databases to be disclosed to law enforcement, credit reporting
agencies, and to protect the health and safety of the individ-
ual. 125 However, when information is requested on an individ-
ual, that person must be informed of the purpose of the
disclosure and the uses to which the information will be put. 126
The individual may request review and amendment of such
records, and disclosure must only be with written consent, un-
less disclosure is for a "routine use." 27 This "routine use" ex-
ception tends to negate much of the Act's privacy protection by
allowing an agency to disclose a record concerning an individ-
ual, if such disclosure is for a purpose that is specifically com-
patible with the purpose for which the information was
gathered. 28 Violations of the Privacy Act may be redressed by
money damages and injunctive relief.' 29 However, the Privacy
Act is only effective against government disclosure of private
facts; it has no effect on private entities. 30
c. Critics Of The Privacy Act
Privacy advocates have criticized the effectiveness of the
Privacy Act and have called for stronger protections especially
in light of expanding computer networking. The American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) has charged that the Privacy Act only
mildly deters government exploitation of private information.
They argue that social security numbers are being increasingly
misused and as an example point to the mandatory reporting of
children's Social Security Numbers (SSN) on tax forms. The act
is also criticized because of its specific exception that allows
government disclosure without consent if the disclosure is a
"routine use" of the information.
125. See id. § 552(b)(7).
126. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 Executive Order 12600 §1 (1987).
127. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 Executive Order 12291 (1981).
128. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a) (notes) (West 1994).
129. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a) (note 6) (West 1994).
130. See 5 U.S.C. §552(a) (1996).
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7. Acts Protecting Financial Information
a. Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)131
Although the FCRA does not provide protections against
privacy incursions by non-government actors, other statutes do
provide protection in the area of financial information. The
FCRA regulates disclosure of personal information by credit re-
porting agencies, but not the collection of this information. 132
Under the FCRA, credit bureaus must maintain procedures to
protect against reporting inaccurate or obsolete credit informa-
tion, and allow consumers to review their records and correct
inaccuracies.133 Credit reports may only be disclosed with per-
mission, under court order, or for certain enumerated purposes
(e.g., credit, insurance, employment, government benefits eligi-
bility, and legitimate business needs). 34 A major weakness of
the act from a privacy perspective is that agencies are not re-
quired to notify individuals of the existence, content, or use of
financial records. Thus, enforcement of the FCRA may actually
provide little privacy protection.
b. Right To Financial Privacy Act (RFPA) Of 1978135
This act was passed to overturn United States v. Miller,136
which held that an individual had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in records held by a bank.137 The RFPA response was to
set procedural restrictions on federal agency access to a bank's
records of its customers. However, the financial institution may
notify law enforcement if it has a suspicion of crime. Disclosure
may then be authorized by warrant, subpoena, or consent. The
act has no applicability to disclosure to non-government
entities.
c. Related Statutes
Other related acts that regulate disclosure and consumer
reporting of financial information are the Fair Credit Billing
131. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681(t) (1994).
132. See id. § 1681(b).
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. 12 U.S.C. § 3401 (1994).
136. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
137. See id. at 442.
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Act of 1974;138 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act of 1977; 139
Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974;140 and the Electronic
Fund Transfer Act of 1978.141
8. Acts Protecting Medical Records
At the present time, there is no federal statute that pro-
tects the confidentiality of medical records. However, there is
an initiative in the works to pass such a law. Some states have
confidentiality statutes, but these laws offer varying degrees of
protection and many states have no laws at all. The medical
profession treats improper disclosure of sensitive data as an
ethical violation, but for the most part this is an unwritten and
unenforceable rule. New Jersey has no specific statute gov-
erning the disclosure of medical records. New Jersey state
courts have treated cases involving disputes over disclosure
within a general duty of confidentiality imposed on the health
care profession based on a patient's right to privacy. 142 This ob-
ligation of confidentiality applies to patient records and infor-
mation, and applies not only to physicians but to hospitals as
well.
9. Other Acts Protecting Private Information
a. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act Of
1974143
This statute regulates the disclosure of and access to educa-
tional records, and allows students to review their records and
prevent disclosure. 44
138. 15 U.S.C. § 1666 (1994).
139. Id. § 1692.
140. Id. § 1691.
141. Id. § 1693.
142. See, e.g., Estate of Behringer, v. Med. Ctr. 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. 1991).
143. Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 571 (codified in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.).
144. See id. § 513.
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b. Driver's Privacy Protection Act Of 1994145
This statute makes it a criminal act for state motor vehicle
offices to release driving record, age, or address information
without a legitimate purpose. 146
c. Cable Communications Policy Act Of 1984141
This act imposes restrictions on cable television systems re-
garding collection, use and disclosure of subscriber information,
including the viewing habits of customers. 148 The cable systems
must notify customers regarding information collected and may
only disclose such data if the customer has first been given the
opportunity to prohibit or limit such disclosure. 149
d. Video Privacy Protection Act Of 1988150
This act prohibits the disclosure of information regarding
the names of videos rented by individuals. 151 However, cus-
tomer lists arranged by subject matter (but not by specific title)
may be released if the customer has an opportunity to prohibit
such disclosure. This law was passed after the public disclosure
of Judge Robert Bork's video rental history while he was being
considered for appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court.
e. Health Insurance Portability And Accountability
Act Of 1996152
The main focus of this act is to regulate the health insur-
ance industry to combat waste, fraud, and abuse. It also con-
tains particular provisions to assure that medical information is
utilized in a manner that appropriately protects the confidenti-
ality of the information and the privacy of individuals receiving
health care services and items.
145. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (1994).
146. See id. § 2721(a).
147. 47 U.S.C. § 551 (1994).
148. See id. §§ 551(b)(2)(A), (B), (c)(2)(C)(ii).
149. See id. §§ 551(a)(1)(A), (b)(1).
150. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710-2711 (1994).
151. See id. § 2710(b)(1).
152. Pub. L. 104-191 (1996).
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D. Proposed Legislation
1. Medical Information Privacy And Security Act 153
This bill was sponsored by Senator Leahy to "provide indi-
viduals with access to health information of which they are the
subject, ensure personal privacy with respect to personal medi-
cal records and health care-related information, impose crimi-
nal and civil penalties for unauthorized use of personal health
information, and to provide for the strong enforcement of these
rights."154 The bill requires that persons that are the subject of
protected health information be given access to that informa-
tion. 55 It further requires specified parties to establish safe-
guards to ensure the confidentiality, security, accuracy, and
integrity of protected health information; and imposes restric-
tions on use and disclosure. 56 The bill also establishes the Of-
fice of Health Information Privacy, specifying its duties to
receive and investigate violation complaints and conduct au-
dits.157 Criminal and civil sanctions are imposed for viola-
tions. 158 This bill is generally more restrictive than the HHS
proposals and it is likely that any final law passed will be some-
what less protective of privacy.
2. Fair Health Information Practices Act Of 1997159
This bill was sponsored by Representative Condit to estab-
lish a code of fair information practices for health information.
The bill requires, subject to exceptions, health information
trustees (e.g., health care providers) to permit individuals to ex-
amine their protected health information, such as physical or
mental health records created or received by health care trust-
ees.160 Under the bill the trustees "may use protected health
153. S. 1368, 105th Cong. (1997).
154. In the 104th Congress, Senators Bennett and Leahy co-sponsored S. 1360
("the Bennett-Leahy bill") on the topic of health information privacy. See S. 1360,
104th Congress (1996). This earlier bill was defeated, and Sen. Leahy now pro-
poses this revised version. It is expected that Sen. Bennett may also propose his
own separate version during the current session.
155. See S. 1368(I)(A) § 101(a)(1), 105th Cong. (1997).
156. See S. 1368(I)(B) § 111, 105th Cong. (1997).
157. See S. 1368(III)(A) § 301, 105th Cong. (1997).
158. See S. 1368(III)(B)(1) §§ 312, 312(2), 321, 105th Cong. (1997).
159. H.R. 52, 105th Cong. (1997).
160. See H.R. 52(I)(A) § 101(a)(1), 105th Cong. (1997).
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information only for a purpose: (1) that is compatible with and
directly related to the purpose for which the information was
collected or received by the trustee;" or (2) for which the trustee
has received disclosure authorization. 161 The bill does make ex-
ceptions regarding: (1) next of kin and directory information; (2)
public health; (3) health research; (4) emergencies; (5) judicial
and administrative purposes; (6) law enforcement; and (7) sub-
poenas, warrants, and search warrants. 162
3. Consumer Internet Privacy Protection Act of 1997163
This bill was sponsored by Representative Vento to prohibit
interactive computer services from disclosing "to a third party
any personally identifiable information provided by a subscriber
without the subscriber's informed written consent."1 64 The bill
permits the subscriber to revoke such consent at any time and
requires the service to cease disclosing such information, and
permits enforcement by private civil actions. 65 The bill also re-
quires, at a subscriber's request, interactive computer services
to: (1) provide the individual with his or her personally identifi-
able information maintained by the service; (2) permit the sub-
scriber to verify and to correct such information; and (3) provide
to the subscriber the identity of the third party recipients of
such information. 166 The FTC is also granted the authority to:
(1) investigate whether a service has been or is engaged in any
act or practice prohibited by this Act; and (2) if so, issue a cease
and desist order as if such service were in violation of specified
provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 67
4. Federal Internet Privacy Protection Act Of 1997168
This bill was sponsored by Representative Barrett and pro-
hibits any Federal agency from making available through the
Internet any record with respect to an individual. 69 The bill
161. H.R. 52(I)(B) § 111(a)(1), (2), 105th Cong. (1997).
162. See H.R. 52(I)(B) §§ 114-120, 105th Cong. (1997).
163. H.R. 98, 105th Cong. (1997).
164. Id. § 2(a)(1).
165. See id. § 2(a)(2).
166. See id. §§ 2(c)(1)(A), (B).
167. See id. § 3(b)(1).
168. H.R. 1367, 105th Cong. (1997).
169. See id. § 2(a).
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permits a civil action to be brought against an agency by an in-
dividual suffering harm as a result of any case in which an
agency makes available through the Internet a record with re-
spect to the individual (including a case in which a record was
made available through the Internet before enactment of this
Act).170
5. Communications Privacy And Consumer
Empowerment Act 171
This bill was re-introduced by Representative Markey to re-
quire the FTC to determine ways for consumers to stop unau-
thorized on-line use of personal information. 172 The bill directs
the FCC to assess whether ISPs adequately protect against un-
authorized interception of communications and personal infor-
mation.' 73 It requires ISPs to offer customer screening software
designed to limit access to material that is inappropriate for
children. 74 Finally, it "prohibits the Federal Government or
State governments from: (1) restricting or regulating the sale in
interstate commerce of encryption or other products for im-
provement of data security; (2) conditioning the issuance of cer-
tificates of authentication or authority upon any escrowing or
sharing of private encryption keys; or (3) establishing a licens-
ing or other regulatory scheme that requires key escrow as a
condition of regulatory approval."175
6. Social Security On-Line Privacy Protection Act 176
This bill was sponsored by Representative Franks to pro-
hibit an ISP from disclosing SSNs or related personal informa-
tion without prior written consent. 77 It requires the ISP to
permit an individual to revoke any consent at any time, upon
which revocation the ISP shall cease disclosing such number or
170. See id. § 2(b).
171. H.R. 1964, 105th Cong. (1997).
172. See id. § 101.
173. See H.R. 1964(I) § 102(2), 105th Cong. (1997).
174. See id. § 103.
175. H.R. 1964(11) § 203, 105th Cong. (1997).
176. H.R. 1287, 105th Cong. (1997).
177. See id. § 2(a).
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information to a third party. 178 Under this bill, the Federal
Trade Commission has enforcement authority.
179
7. Internet Freedom And Child Protection Act Of 1997180
This bill was sponsored by Representative Lofgren to repeal
restrictions on transmitting obscene materials to minors using
telecommunications or computer equipment.' 8 ' The bill re-
quires an ISP to offer customer-screening software to limit ac-
cess to material that is unsuitable for children. 82
8. Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail Choice Act Of 199783
This bill was sponsored by Senator Murkowski to require a
person who transmits unsolicited commercial e-mail to promi-
nently display the word "advertisement" along with the sender's
name, e-mail address, and phone number. 84 The bill will not be
applied to ISPs unless it was the ISP that initiated the trans-
mission. Consumer requests for termination of unsolicited mail
must be honored within 48 hours. The bill empowers the FTC
with regulatory authority over such unsolicited e-mail,
although the bill authorizes a private right of action within 1
year after receipt of the transmission.
8 5
9. Electronic Mailbox Protection Act Of 1997186
This bill, which was sponsored by Senator Torricelli, levies
a $5,000 civil penalty on any person who transmits an unsolic-
ited e-mail message and uses a technical procedure to disguise
the source. 8 7 It applies to senders who fail to comply with the
request of the recipient to cease sending e-mail messages.
88
178. See id. § 2(b).
179. See id. § 3(b).
180. H.R. 774, 105th Cong. (1997).
181. See id.
182. See id. § 2(d)(1).
183. S. 771, 105th Cong. (1997).
184. See id. § 3(a)(1).
185. See id. §§ 4(a), 8(a).
186. S. 875, 105th Cong. (1997).
187. See id. § 3(a).
188. See id. § 3(a)(3).
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The bill empowers the FTC with regulatory authority over such
unsolicited e-mail. 8 9
10. Netizens Protection Act Of 1997190
This bill is sponsored by Representative Chris Smith (R-
NJ) and was introduced on May 22, 1997.191 The bill, which is
actually an extension of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act of 1991,192 created a cause of action against "junk faxes.' 93
The bill extends the protection against junk faxes to unsolicited
commercial e-mail or "spam," essentially creating a scheme
through which potential recipients must "opt-in" to receiving
unsolicited commercial e-mail. 94
E. Common Law And State Statutes
1. Privacy Torts
Tort law is a traditional means of redressing violations of
privacy interests in the private sector, as discussed in the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts.' 95 In particular, employee privacy
is recognized as a protected interest under state common law.
In the context of e-mail and on-line privacy, there are four torts
of potential importance.
a. Intrusion Upon Seclusion
This tort creates liability against one who intentionally in-
trudes (physically or otherwise) upon the seclusion of another or
his private affairs where such intrusion would be highly offen-
sive to a reasonable person. 96 Electronic means of intrusion
would fall within the ambit of this tort. Actions here could be
brought regarding access to private communications (e-mail),
and intrusion via junk e-mail.
This tort is limited in that:
189. See id. § 3(b).
190. H.R. 1748, 105th Cong. (1997).
191. See id.
192. Public Law 102-243, 102nd Cong. (1991).
193. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(3) (1994).
194. See H.R. 1748 § 2(3)(1), 105th Cong. (1997).
195. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-652E (1977).
196. See id. § 652B.
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the action must be intentional so that accidental access to e-mail
would not give rise to liability;
the matter must be "private" such that the plaintiff would need to
show a reasonable expectation of privacy;
the intrusion must be "highly offensive"; and
in the employee setting, pre-established consent (including an an-
nounced employer policy of non-privacy of all e-mail communica-
tions) would work as a defense.
The few cases based on this tort in the employee e-mail context
have dismissed the claim and are summarized as follows:
Flanagan v. Epson America Inc 97 - In this case, employees
claimed that a tap on the company's e-mail system violated
their expectation of privacy when their messages were read
and printed without consent.198 The court held for the de-
fendant company because California does not recognize e-
mail as a type of communication afforded privacy protec-
tion. 199 Other California cases in accord are Shoars v. Ep-
son America Inc.200 and Bourke v. Nissan Motor Co.20 1
Smyth v. Pillsbury Co. 20 2 - In this case, an employee claimed an
invasion of privacy when his e-mail messages were read
and printed after he was repeatedly assured that such com-
munications were to be kept confidential and privileged. 20 3
The employee was fired after sending messages concerning
the sales staff, containing threats to "kill the back-stabbing
bastards."20 4 In interpreting Pennsylvania law, the federal
court found no reasonable expectation of privacy in
messages voluntarily communicated over the company e-
mail system, regardless of any assurances of confidential-
ity.205 The court also found that the employer's interception
of such messages was not offensive, and that the company's
197. No. BC 007036, slip op. (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 1991).
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. No. B073234, slip op. (Cal. Ct. App.), review denied, No. S040065, 1994
Cal. LEXIS 3670 (June 29, 1994).
201. No. YC 003979, slip op. (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1991).
202. 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D.Pa. 1996).
203. See id. at 98.
204. Id. at 98, n.1.
205. See id. at 99.
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interest in preventing unprofessional comments out-
weighed any privacy interest on the part of the employee.20 6
b. Publicity Given To Private Life
This tort creates liability against one who gives publicity to
private, personal information if the disclosure would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and if the matter is not of legit-
imate public concern. 20 7 Like defamation, this tort is limited by
First Amendment concerns regarding the freedom of speech and
press to publicize true facts. Since publicity in this context es-
sentially means disclosure to a large number of people, dissemi-
nation of private information via the Internet would qualify.
The tort is limited in that the matter must be private and the
behavior offensive as noted above.
c. Placing A Party In A False Light
This tort creates liability against one who gives publicity to
a matter concerning another that places the other in a false
light if the false light would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person, and if the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless
disregard as to the falsity.20 8 This tort could be applied to mis-
information published on the web subject to the offensiveness
and scienter limitations.
d. Right Of Publicity
This tort creates liability against one who appropriates, to
his own use or benefit, the name or likeness of another.20 9 It is
recognized that one has a privacy interest in the exclusive use
of his own identity. This interest is restricted however, when
inconsistent with First Amendment principles, as when a news-
paper publishes the name or photograph of someone in connec-
tion with a newsworthy event.210 This principle was tested in
the on-line context in Stern v. Delphi Internet Servs. Corp.,211
206. See id. at 101.
207. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
208. See id. § 652E.
209. See id. § 652C.
210. See Stern v. Delphi Internet Servs. Corp., 626 N.Y.S.2d 694 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1995).
211. 626 N.Y.S.2d 694 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1995).
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where radio personality Howard Stern sued the Delphi system
for using his photograph without permission in an advertise-
ment for an on-line debate regarding Stern's candidacy for gov-
ernor of New York.212  The court held for Delphi on First
Amendment grounds because of the newsworthy quality of the
event. 21
3
2. Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress
This tort might be applicable in the employment context
where an employer intentionally or recklessly caused severe
emotional distress to the employee by extreme and outrageous
conduct. 214 However, liability here would only seem to attach in
extreme situations. Ordinary employer monitoring of an em-
ployee's communications on an employer-owned system would
not likely constitute "outrageous" conduct. Misuse or
threatened unprivileged dissemination of acquired information
or more extensive monitoring of personal messages than the
business purpose requires would need to be shown. Further,
the employee would have to show actual injury in order to es-
tablish employer liability.
3. Conversion
The tort of conversion has been recognized in the on-line
context in the case of Compuserve, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions,
21 5
where the excessive storage of junk e-mail on CompuServe's
computers represented a "taking."216 In relation to ordinary
consumers, forced downloading of junk e-mail and files that is
paid for by the consumer in access fees may also be actionable.
4. Trade Secret Laws
A tort action will lie for misappropriation of trade secrets if
there is an actual trade secret, and if there is either a breach of
confidence regarding that secret or the secret is accessed by im-
proper means.217 The first element requires that information be
212. See id. at 695.
213. See id. at 700.
214. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1977).
215. 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
216. See id. at 1020.
217. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1977).
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kept secret where the owner has taken sufficient measures to
maintain that secrecy.215 If a company's private information is
communicated by businesses on-line, then the company must
take steps (e.g., encryption) to protect it. A company might also
form an agreement with an ISP regarding the secrecy of its data
kept within an ISP database. Under such a confidential rela-
tionship, the ISP would be liable for damage to the company if
the data were disclosed. A trade secret claim could also be
made against any hacker that damaged a company through
gaining unauthorized access to its data.
5. New Jersey Wiretapping Statute219
Most states have enacted wiretap statutes that provide
comparable protection to that of the ECPA. State statutes are
generally not preempted by the ECPA if they afford greater pri-
vacy protection than the ECPA. As such, it is possible for activi-
ties of ISPs and employers that are exempt under the ECPA to,
nevertheless, create liability under state statutes. However,
privacy protection under these statutes is generally not much
greater than that afforded by the ECPA. In fact, New Jersey
has a provision expressly favoring law enforcement, which pro-
vides that a court order may require ISPs to create and release
backup copies of private communications for preservation as
evidence. 220
V. Self Regulation
A. The Industry View
Beyond legal regulation of privacy issues, non-mandatory
guidelines and self-interest may provide a framework for pri-
vacy protection in the on-line world. Government intervention
may not be the appropriate solution because of the difficulty of
keeping laws current with the technology and because of the
possibility of inhibiting technological and commercial progress.
In support of this view, the industry has argued that market
pressures will force self-regulation regarding privacy of infor-
mation as users make their privacy preferences known. In light
218. See id.
219. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A (et seq.) (West 1998).
220. See id. § 2A:156A-12.
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of the universal interest in promoting the benefits of network-
ing technology, it is argued that ISPs, employers and other
players will not engage in activity that is so invasive as to frus-
trate use of e-mail and other systems.
B. The Privacy View
In opposition to the industry view, privacy advocates argue
that in light of the actual privacy violations that have already
occurred, self-regulation has already failed.221 The argument is
further made that, under non-mandatory guidelines, companies
that respect privacy and adhere to guidelines will be at a com-
petitive disadvantage in comparison to those that do not. AOL's
changed privacy policy (as previously discussed) may be an indi-
cation that industry's self-regulation is on the decline, causing
concern for on-line users.
VI. Self-Help
Many individuals and businesses are turning to self-help
approaches for solving their privacy and security needs. While
the primary technique of ensuring the confidentiality of e-mail
information is encryption, other means of hiding identity and
transactional information are also in use.
A. Encryption
Encryption has long been employed by the military to se-
cure information from hostile forces. But with the advent of
ubiquitous digital communications in the commercial world has
also come readily available and extremely powerful encryption
software that rivals the effectiveness of military capabilities.
The strong encryption schemes are for all practical purposes
"unbreakable."
1. Symmetrical Encryption
This type of encryption has been in use since ancient times.
The approach here is that a sender uses a particular code key to
encrypt a message. The receiver must be in possession of the
same key to de-encrypt the message. The problem with this
221. Such privacy advocates include the Center for Democracy and Technol-
ogy (CDT) and the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC).
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scheme is that it is impractical to distribute a confidential key
to more than a small number of trusted parties. The U.S. mili-
tary has used this approach under the Defense Encryption
Standard in conjunction with complex key management
schemes to control how keys are transmitted and/or distributed
to maintain the integrity of the system.
2. Asymmetrical Encryption
A more recent approach is asymmetrical encryption
whereby separate private and public keys are used to encrypt
and decrypt messages. Although the private and public keys
are mathematically related, knowledge of one is insufficient to
allow computation of the other. With asymmetric encryption,
the sender will use a private key to encrypt a message that may
only be de-encrypted with the corresponding public key pos-
sessed by the receiver. The private key must be kept confiden-
tial and is only possessed by its owner. In contrast, the public
key may be possessed by anyone because it is of no value, except
as the complement to the private key. A potential flaw in this
scheme is that individuals using the public key need to be as-
sured that this key is indeed associated with the bona fide
sender and not an impostor. One solution is to employ trusted
Certification Authorities (CA) that can vouch for and verify the
binding between public keys and their proper owners. There
are a number of commercial software packages, such as Secure
Messenger, RSA, PGP and Viacrypt that provide asymmetrical
encryption capabilities. In addition, companies like Verisign
and GTE are providing CA services.
3. Confidential Communications On The Internet
The use of encryption to ensure confidentiality is of special
concern for attorneys because of their special ethical responsi-
bilities. Specific considerations that should be weighed by at-
torneys in deciding to communicate without encryption over an
unprotected network (such as the Internet) include possible eth-
ics violations, malpractice, compromised reputation with cli-
ents, waiver of the attorney-client privilege, and loss of client
trade secret protection.
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VII. Legislation
A. Current U.S. Policies
In the United States, until December 1996, the export of
cryptographic products was controlled by the Department of
State via the Arms Export Control Act 222 under the depart-
ment's International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). 223
Under ITAR, no cryptographic product could be exported with-
out an export license issued by the Department of State, and
licenses were generally not granted for products that provide
"strong" encryption (e.g., greater than 40 bit codes). 224 However,
on November 15, 1996 under Executive Order 13026,225 Presi-
dent Clinton transferred the responsibility for control of export
of cryptographic products to the Department of Commerce. 226
To this end, the President amended the Export Administration
Regulations (EAR) 227 as part of a plan to implement a world-
wide key management infrastructure featuring key escrow and
key recovery provisions. To allow a transition period for the de-
velopment of this key management infrastructure, if an ex-
porter makes satisfactory commitments to build and/or market
recoverable encryption items and to help build the supporting
international infrastructure, the present EAR rule permits the
export and re-export of 56-bit key length Defense Encryption
Standard or equivalent strength encryption items under the au-
thority of a License Exception. 228 This policy applies to both
hardware and software. Both privacy and electronic commerce
advocates are now calling for legislation to change these restric-
tive policies.
1. U.S. Government Clipper Initiatives
In the face of inexpensive commercial encryption packages
that are essentially bulletproof, law enforcement has argued
that its ability to control crime will be seriously degraded.
Therefore, the "Clipper" initiatives have been proposed as a
222. 22 U.S.C. §2778 (1996).
223. See 22 C.F.R. pts. 120-130 (1998).
224. See 22 U.S.C. § 121.1 category XI(b)(1) (1996).
225. 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2399 (1996).
226. See id. § 1.
227. 15 C.F.R. § 730 et seq. (1996).
228. See id.
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means of implementing private security while at the same time
allowing law enforcement to decrypt secure data for legitimate
purposes. Over time, three different plans have been proposed:
a. Clipper I
This was a 1993 proposed hardware solution where commu-
nications would be uniquely identified using keys permanently
embedded in hardware (i.e., the clipper chip). This was in-
tended to provide a "back door" to government to permit legiti-
mate eavesdropping of otherwise confidential communications.
b. Clipper II
This was a 1995 proposed mandatory Commercial Key Es-
crow (CKE) framework for public key encryption that would al-
low businesses to select their own encryption algorithms, but
which also would provide the government with means to gain
access to encrypted data.
c. Clipper III
This is also called the Electronic Data Security Act of 1997
draft legislation, and is a proposal for a Key Management Infra-
structure (KMI) for public key encryption whereby private CA
and key escrow entities would operate under government poli-
cies. To participate in the system, users would have to make
sure their private keys were deposited with trusted agents that
would be permitted to release the keys to the government for
purposes of law enforcement. To date, none of the Clipper pro-
posals have been formally approved or made mandatory in the
commercial sector. Conformance with Clipper policies is only
mandatory at present for contracts with government.
2. Secure Public Networks Act 229
This bill was sponsored by Senator McCain to allow the use
of any encryption desired, except as otherwise provided by the
bill or by law.230 The bill would prohibit the Federal Govern-
ment or a State from requiring the escrow of an encryption key
229. S. 909, 105th Cong. (1997).
230. See id. § 101.
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with a third party.231 Key recovery agents would be required to
disclose recovery information to government for specified lawful
purposes. 232 Regarding the export of encryption, the Secretary
of Commerce is granted "jurisdiction over the export of commer-
cial encryption products and the sole duty to issue export
licenses on such products."233 The President is authorized to in-
crease the encryption strength for products permitted to be ex-
ported. The bill criminally prohibits export "if the Secretary
finds that a product would be: (1) used in acts against the na-
tional security, public safety, transportation systems, communi-
cations networks, or essential systems of interstate commerce;
(2) diverted to a military, terrorist, or criminal use; or (3) re-
exported without authorization."234
3. Security And Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE)
Act Of 1997235
This bill was sponsored by Representative Goodlatte and is
intended to relax federal governmental export controls on en-
cryption.236 Several amendments have been proposed. The
original Goodlatte language has been substantially amended by
five House committees to provide law enforcement with easy ac-
cess to encrypted information. Representative Solomon (R-NY),
chairman of the House Rules Committee, has indicated that he
will not send the legislation to the House floor unless it contains
domestic controls providing law enforcement access.
4. Encrypted Communications Privacy Act Of 1997237
This bill was sponsored by Senator Leahy to allow any per-
son to make non-criminal use of encryption, regardless of al-
gorithm or key length.238 The bill prohibits Federal or State
Government from requiring that a decryption key be given to
another person. 239
231. See S. 909(I) § 102, 105th Cong. (1997).
232. See id. § 106.
233. S. 909(111), 105th Cong. (1997).
234. Id. § 306.
235. H.R. 695, 105th Cong. (1997).
236. See id.
237. S. 376, 105th Cong. (1997).
238. See id. § 5(a).
239. See id. § 5(b).
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5. Computer Security Enhancement Act Of 1997240
This bill was sponsored by Representative Sensenbrenner
to amend the National Institute of Standards and Technology
Act to require NIST to: (1) "assist in establishing voluntary in-
teroperable standards" and guidelines to facilitate the estab-
lishment of non-Federal public key management
infrastructures that can be used to conduct transactions with
the Federal Government; 241 and (2) provide assistance to Fed-
eral agencies in the protection of computer networks. 242 The bill
was passed in the House and is under consideration by the
Senate.
6. Promotion of Commerce On-Line In The Digital Era
(Pro-CODE) Act Of 1997243
This bill was sponsored by Senator Burns to prohibit the
Secretary of Commerce (acting through NIST or otherwise)
from promulgating or enforcing regulations, or otherwise carry-
ing out policies that: (1) result in encryption standards intended
for use by businesses or entities other than Federal computer
systems;244 or (2) have the effect of imposing Government-
designed encryption standards on the private sector by restrict-
ing the export of computer hardware and computer software
with encryption capabilities. 245
B. Pseudonyms
To protect their interest in anonymity, on-line users fre-
quently use pseudonyms in making public statements. Many
ISPs allow users to adopt pseudonyms in "signing" public
messages posted on the electronic bulletin boards provided by
the ISP. Although laudable in its promotion of free speech, this
practice has unfortunately been abused by some users in perpe-
trating child pornography, defamation and copyright
infringement.
240. H.R. 1903, 105th Cong. (1997).
241. See id. § 3(2).
242. See id. § 4.
243. S. 377, 105th Cong. (1997).
244. See id. § 4(a).
245. See id. § 4(b).
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C. Anonymous Remailers
Anonymous remailers are special on-line services that re-
ceive messages from users, strip their identifying information
and then forward them to their intended destination. In this
case, the source of the message can only be traced back to the
remailer and not to the original sender. This provides the same
free speech benefits as pseudonyms with the same dangers for
abuse.
D. Use Of Digital Cash
One of the primary benefits of using ordinary cash in a com-
mercial transaction is the fact that it cannot be traced back to
the purchaser. "Digital cash" schemes are now being used to
provide this same privacy attribute. Although it might appear
as though the only people with a real need for the ability to
spend anonymously are criminals, this is not really true. It is
also desirable to many people to be able to conduct anonymous
transactions in the interest of protecting a variety of personal
data, a privacy interest already compromised in the context of
credit card purchases.
E. ISPs, Firewalls, The Anonymizer, And Cookie Killers
If a user accesses the Internet through an ISP such as AOL,
CompuServe and others, the ISP's proxy server acts as an inter-
mediary to protect the user's identity and e-mail address. Web
sites that attempt to trace the user's location will only be able to
do so as far as the proxy server. In this case, only the ISP could
trace the user's "clickstream" data. Intranets that are protected
by firewalls will likewise provide this same protection. A fire-
wall is a piece of software operating on the computer that acts
as the gateway from a private network to the Internet. The fire-
wall software provides an intelligent "filter" between networks
that monitor message traffic and screen out unauthorized data.
The Anonymizer is a special web service that may be used
to block web sites from collecting user information. 246 The user
simply goes to that site, and then makes all subsequent links
from there. It prevents collection of source and other data, or
246. See Anonymizer, Inc. - Comprehensive identity privacy and anonymity
services (visited Oct. 24, 1998) <http://www.anonymizer.com>.
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the introduction of cookies onto the user computer. The only
disadvantage is that it will slow down the access time involved
in surfing from site to site. The Anonymizer also provides a
sample service whereby it can display to you the type of infor-
mation that can be collected as a result of your visiting that site.
For example, it may display your site provider, approximate ge-
ographic location, and browser type.
There are also software programs available to control the
placement of cookies on a user's computer. As mentioned,
browsers such as Netscape and Internet Explorer allow users to
set options to provide notice when a web site is attempting to
place a cookie. Further, there are programs such as "Cookie
Cutter," "Cookie Crusher," and "Cookie Master" that both per-
mit removal of existing cookies and prevent the placement of
new cookies.
VIII. Other Means to Enhance Privacy
A. Universal Registration Systems (I/Code system)
This is a system proposed by the Internet Profiles Corpora-
tion where users register personal data with the I/Code system
and then receive a unique identifier that allows anonymous
browsing. This approach attempts to protect both privacy and
market interests in that anonymity is protected, while aggre-
gate demographic information may still be collected for market-
ing analysis. The aggregate data could not, however, be traced
to an individual.
B. Cookies
A use beneficial to privacy has actually been proposed for
the much-maligned "cookie." Instead of being used as an infor-
mation-gathering tool, a cookie could be used to store privacy
preference data. Once the user communicated his privacy pref-
erence to the web site, the site would honor requests for consent
and notice regarding collection of information. The only catch
here is that voluntary compliance by the web site would be re-
quired. Another beneficial effect of cookies is to prevent expo-
sure to unwanted or repetitious advertising. Since the cookie
stores user preference information, it may be used to filter ad-
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vertisements that are irrelevant to the user or to keep track of
whether a given advertisement has already been viewed.
C. Platform For Internet Content Selection (PICS)
This system was initially developed by the WWW Consor-
tium at MIT for the purpose of allowing parents to block chil-
dren's access to sites that were deemed "objectionable" in terms
of pornographic, violent or hateful content. Under this ap-
proach, when a user attempts to access a given web site, the
PICS software first checks with a central database to determine
if the site has been marked as "objectionable." If so, the user's
access to the site will be blocked. However, because the system
itself is "viewpoint neutral," it could also be used to rate sites
regarding the privacy protections that they make available. Us-
ing this system, those sites not listed as secure would be blocked
from access. Like any censoring approach, PICS is however
subject to abuse in the "ratings" system.
IX. Conclusion
The problems involved in maintaining personal privacy will
continue to be issues of debate and dispute and the impetus for
new laws in the foreseeable future. As society progresses fur-
ther into the information age, personal data will be collected
and exploited at an ever-expanding rate. In addition, the tech-
nological means to accomplish this will continue to evolve at a
pace that will challenge and perhaps confound the legal profes-
sion. Our present privacy laws, already out of date, will be fur-
ther stretched and likely made even less effective in providing
protection. As seen, laws like the ECPA have already been se-
verely weakened by on-line communications technology. For
example, because the ECPA allows access to stored communica-
tion, this means from a practical perspective that all e-mail is
accessible by employers and ISPs. Other legal approaches such
as tort law have been held to provide little, if any, protection.
At least from the communications perspective, the self-help
remedy of public key encryption appears to be the best near
term solution to privacy concerns. Efforts to limit domestic en-
cryption thus far have failed, and a number of effective and in-
expensive software and service packages are now available.
The strong societal interest in fostering electronic commerce
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will likely cause continued support for and a ubiquitous pres-
ence of encryption. However, law enforcement will continue to
demand a means for access to encrypted data as no satisfactory
compromise with privacy advocates has yet been proposed.
Threats to privacy of personal information are not easily solved
by self-help, and further legal protection is needed. While the
PPA and the proposed Consumer Internet Privacy Protection
Act are steps in the right direction, stronger regulation must
still be considered. Given the propensity and incentives for en-
tities to probe into the personal affairs of the private individual,
the need for protection will continue to be critical. The very
existence of web sites such as "The Stalker's Home Page" make
this point abundantly clear. 247
X. Sample Policies for Control of Computer Information,
Voice Mail, E-mail and the Internet
A. Sample Policy: Introduction
Employee privacy does not extend to work-related conduct
or to the use of company-provided facilities such as computers.
Use of any of the Computer Systems in violation of any of
the policies herein will result in disciplinary action, up to and
including termination.
B. Prohibited Uses and Communications
Computer Systems are not to be used to send or store any
material of a personal character, other than occasionally and
incidentally. The following types of communication are strictly
prohibited:
Gossip, personal attacks, or embarrassing remarks;
Personal information about yourself or others;
Profanity or obscenity in any form;
Insensitive language which is derogatory, offensive, threatening,
insulting or harmful to morale; and
Sexually-explicit messages, cartoons, or jokes; unwelcome pro-
positions or love letters; ethnic or racial slurs.
247. See The Stalker's Home Page - No More Privacy! - As Seen on the
LEEZA Show (visited Oct. 24, 1998) <http://www.glr.com/stalk.html>.
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C. Monitoring of Computer Systems
All messages sent and received by the computer systems or in-
formation stored in the computer systems are Company
records.
The Company reserves the right to access and disclose all such
messages and information for any business purpose.
Employees should ensure that messages sent, received, and
stored on Company business or with the use of Company
facilities will be available for review without prior notice.
All passwords and encryption keys must be available to
management:
You should not use the computer for the communication or stor-
age of anything you would not want read and further
disclosed.
D. Internet Policy: Permitted Uses
E-mail for business purposes of the Company;
Support of Company customers in their use of Company
services;
Reading and downloading legitimate business data and infor-
mation; and
Downloading bug fixes and patches for authorized commercial
software.
E. Internet Policy: Prohibited Uses
for any unlawful activity;
to make any defamatory remarks, or derogatory remarks based on
race, religion, color, sex, handicap, or national origin;
for distribution, disclosure or selling of proprietary information;
to download or distribute any copyrighted material without li-
cense to do so;
to advocate a religious or political cause;
to promote any commercial enterprise other than approved Com-
pany business;
for an employee's off-the-job pursuits, whether or not commercial
in nature;
for sending or soliciting sexually oriented messages or images;
to seek employment;
to send viruses or to do any act harmful to another person or his
computing resources;
to send "junk" mail or "spamming" e-mail;
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to entrust confidential company information, such as trade secrets
or proprietary information, to this medium without prior
permission.
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